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Abstract
Many products are made by technological processes that cause environmental damage. Current
environmental concerns are a¤ecting rmstechnological processes as a result of government intervention
in markets but also due to environmental awareness on the part of consumers. This paper assumes a
spatial competition model where two rms sell a homogeneous product with input di¤erentiation: the
product is made by green and polluting inputs. In a two-stage game rms rst decide what technology
bundle to use (the ratio of green and polluting inputs) and then Bertrand competition takes place. First,
it is shown that in the absence of government intervention both rms prefer to produce by using a bundle
of green and polluting technologies which is not welfare maximizing. Second, the option of subsidizing
green technology and the existence of a publicly-owned rm are analyzed. Overall, both policies yield
a more environmentally-friendly technology bundle, except when costs of green energy technologies are
high enough. Moreover, environmental social welfare is enhanced.
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1 Introduction
Environmental concerns have become relevant as economic issues for governments in recent years. In par-
ticular, evidence of global warming and an increase in consumers environmental awareness have forced
governments and international institutions to deploy active energy policies in order to minimize environmen-
tal damage caused by economic activities. In the last ten years a number of countries have signed the Kyoto
protocol, which marks the start of a new era where the scarcity of certain energy sources, the improving
of renewable energy technologies (hereinafter called RETs) and a growing consumer movement supporting
green energy are the main drivers. For instance, the electricity sector has incorporated renewable sources
into its technology mix, gasoline companies have investigated new feed-products and improved gasoline, and
buildings and houses in isolated location have incorporated o¤-shore technologies (mainly wind generators
and photovoltaic panels). However, new RETs have a great handicap when competing with traditional
fossil-based technologies (hereinafter called FBTs): the average and marginal costs of RETs are higher than
those of FBTs. To encourage research, development and deployment of RETs and bring them to a degree of
su¢ cient technical maturity where they can compete with FBTs a number of economic measures have been
implemented by governments. Sadly, encouraging prot-oriented rms to produce using RETs is costly and
has no immediate e¤ects in the short run.
This paper presents a spatial duopoly model of horizontal input di¤erentiation with price competition in
the output market. Two rms located à la Hotelling (Hotelling (1929)) sell an output produced using a com-
bination of RETs and FBTs.1 Energy markets can usually decide on the bases when designing the technology
bundle to produce a given output. Electricity can be generated by using coal-burning units, combined-cycle
plants and other traditional fossil-based technologies but also by mean of wind farms, photovoltaic panels
and other renewable energy processes. The motor industry is also able to make hybrid vehicles, in which an
internal-combustion engine is combined with an electric motor. The model presented here also takes into
account the environmental awareness of consumers and a welfare function which includes the environmental
damage that results from technological processes. It is assumed that the goal of government is twofold: (i)
to increase the amount of RETs and decrease the amount of FBTs in rmstechnology bundles; and (ii)
to maximize an environmental social welfare function. We rst present the market outcome in the absence
of any government intervention and the rst best environmental social welfare solution that a benevolent
social planner would choose. Secondly, as the governments goal is to encourage RETs and enhance the
environmental social welfare function two di¤erent policy measures are studied: (i) a subsidy for RETs; and
(ii) a publicly-owned rm which competes with a prot-oriented rm.
In this setting, our study provides some insights into the debate ongoing concerning the e¤ect of subsidies
1DAspremont et al. (1979) extend the Hotelling model by assuming quadratic costs and show that it is possible for both
rms to locate outside the unit interval. In our model we use a quadratic cost specication but rms are constrained to locate
within the unit interval. Thus, for certain parameter values it is possible to nd corner and semi corner solutions (where one
of the two rms locates at the very end).
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and government intervention on energy markets. In the case of a subsidy aimed at encouraging RETs there
is an ex post market distortion because relative prices are modied by the subsidy. In the case of a publicly-
owned rm, there is an ex ante non negligible market distortion caused by the active role of the government
in the market.
The literature describing markets where green and polluting products coexist has increased in recent
years. Moreover, the e¤ects of environmental regulation on market performance and social welfare are also
of economic interest. In Conrad (2005) a horizontal product di¤erentiation with respect to an environmental
friendly product characteristic is used to model price-environmental quality competition. A trade-o¤between
higher prices for better environmental quality and lower prices for poor environmental quality exists. A term
to incorporate the feeling of guilt at not having purchased the environmentally friendliest product is added
into individual preferences. In this setting, when rms simultaneously choose their respective characteristics
and then they compete in prices, Conrand nds that the location of the social welfare maximizing charac-
teristics is not the same as that chosen by private rms. Even if there is no real environmental damage, the
social optimal location di¤ers from that of the private solution. Erikson (2004) uses horizontal di¤erentiation
to examine the extent to which partial and voluntary internalization of negative environmental externalities
by consumers can replace public intervention. Moraga-Gonzalez and Padrón-Fumero (2002) also measure
the impact of di¤erent environmental policies on aggregate emissions and social welfare in a vertical product
di¤erentiation approach where consumers are willing to pay more for less polluting goods. They nd that
there is a trade-o¤ between the willingness of consumers to pay and the unit emissions of rms. The studies
in Porter (1990) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) conclude that environmental regulations by govern-
ments improve welfare because they can open up new investment opportunities, encourage rms to innovate
and generate long term gains that can o¤set the costs of complying with them. Along these lines, André et
al. (2009) show that rms prot from the existence of a rule penalizing any rm that refuses to produce an
environmentally friendly good. In a recent paper Matsukawa (2012) studies the e¤ects on welfare of subsidies
and emission taxes in a green market where the product is environmentally di¤erentiated. He concludes that
an emission tax is always welfare dominant because it induces rms to improve the environmental qualities
of their product as well as the environmental awareness of consumers. Kurtyka and Mahenc (2011) study
optimal taxation on a pollutant variety in a duopoly where rms can either produce a green or a pollutant
variety à la Hotelling. They specify an environmental function and nd that rms switch from the pollutant
to the green variety when the environmental externality is internalized. Taxation of polluting products is
also analyzed in Cremer and Thisse (1999) for the case when rms cannot evade it and in Macho-Stadler
and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) and Macho-Stadler (2008) for the case when they can.
The benets and costs of privatizing a publicly-owned rm since the 80s have also been analyzed.
Moreover, the literature on mixed oligopoly has studied the extent to which public rms can be used as
a policy instrument to improve resource allocation in oligopolistic markets. In Cremer at al. (1989) and
(1991) the authors speculate as to the possibility of using public rms to maximize social welfare in a Cournot
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setting when the product is homogeneous and when it is di¤erentiated. Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that
it is socially better for the government to privatize a publicly-owned rm if the market is competitive enough
and the publicly-owned rm cannot have the advantage in moving otherwise the existence of a publicly-
owned rm is socially desirable. In an environmental framework, Barcena-Ruíz and Garzón (2006) analyze
government environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly where rms produce a homogeneous good. They show
that the decision whether to privatize a public rm interacts with the environmental policy of governments.2
In our setting of horizontal input di¤erentiation it is shown that in the absence of government inter-
vention rms produce by using a bundle of technologies which strongly depends upon the di¤erence in cost
between RETs and FBTs and on the environmental awareness of consumers. Moreover, both rms prefer to
produce by using a single technology instead of a bundle of technologies only if di¤erences in costs are strong
enough and consumers environmental awareness is low. When the government intervenes the result is a
more environmentally-friendly technology bundle regardless of the measures adopted, except when cost dif-
ferences between RETs and FBTs are very high. In particular, the implementation of a subsidy programme
reduces environmental damage and comes close to the rst best environmental social welfare solution. A
government intervention by mean of a publicly-owned rm fully internalizes environmental damage and force
the private rm to take into account the amount of pollutant emitted into the atmosphere per additional
unit of production. Thus, both policy measures are welfare-enhancing and by means of a publicly-owned
rm the rst best solution is reached. This is in keeping with Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006), who nd
that the public rm should not be privatized when market competition is low enough.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set up of the model and characterizes
the market solution with no government intervention. Section 3 presents environmental policies. Section 4
discusses the implications of government intervention for welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a duopolistic market where a unit mass of uniformly distributed consumers indexed by x live in
the interval [0; ] where  2 (0; 1]. Each consumer buys at most one unit of a product of homogenous quality
environmentally di¤erentiated at the production stage. Firms produce by using RETs and FBTs.3 It is
assumed that rm g, located at tg, is a technologically green-oriented rm which sells a product that causes
pollution to the tune of etg, where e > 0 accounts for the amount of pollutant emitted into the atmosphere per
additional unit of production. Firm f , located at tf , is a technologically fossil-fuel-oriented rm which sells a
product that causes pollution to the tune of etf . Without loss of generality, it is assumed that tg  tf within
2See for instance Sanjo (2009) and Martínez-Sánchez (2011) for a more general discussion on mixed duopolies with horizontal
di¤erentiation and Bertrand competition.
3 In the case of electricity generation it represent the bundle of RETs and FBTs per kilowatt produced. In the case of hybrid
vehicles it represents the proportion of km powered by the electric motor and the proportion of km powered by a gasoline or
diesel motor per 100 km.
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Figure 1: Firmstechnology space and unit mass of consumers as a function of  2 (0; 1].
the unit interval. If the rms locate at the two extremes of the unit interval they make a 100% technologically
green product and a 100% technologically polluting product, respectively. Thus, from the rmspoint of
view the unit interval stands for the environmental quality of the technology bundle, ranging from zero,
which represents the highest environmental quality, to one, which is the lowest environmental quality and
the greatest pollutant emissions. Hence, in our model the assumption of horizontal di¤erentiation is related
to the technology bundle chosen by rms. We also assume that the unit mass of consumers care about
the pollutant emissions caused by FBTs and show some degree of awareness of environmental damage. We
use the exogenous parameter  to capture this idea of environmental awareness at aggregate level. Even
though consumers know that this e¤ect is negligible at individual level they experiment some altruism that
yields to this aggregate environmental awareness e¤ect, which increases as it approaches zero (that is, as
consumersguilt at not purchasing a pure green-produced goods increases). Figure 1 depicts the technological
and environmental space where rms and consumers live.
The net utility of a consumer located at x is:
Ui (x) =
8<:   (x  tg)
2   pg if he/she buys from i = g
  (tf   x)2   pf if he/she buys from i = f:
(1)
Parameter  represents the consumers utility obtained from purchasing a product that complies with his/her
ideal technology bundle and pi (i = g; f) is the price of the product. The disutility experienced by a consumer
from not purchasing that technological bundle is assumed to be quadratic; hence it is (x  tg)2 and (tf  x)2
when a consumer located at x buys a unit of output from the green-oriented and fossilfuel-oriented rm,
respectively. Moreover, we also assume that  is large enough for full coverage of the market to be socially
e¢ cient. Firmsdemand functions are,
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Di (x) =
8<:
R x
0
f(x)dx if i = gR 
x
f(x)dx if i = f;
(2)
where x is the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from g and f ,
x =
tf + tg
2
+
pf   pg
2 (tf   tg) ;
according to Ug (x) = Uf (x) and where f(x) = 1= is a density function in 0  x  . The cost incurred
by a rm when it produces output by using a technology bundle ti is cg (1  ti) + cf ti. It is assumed that
cg  cf . This means that a pure green product requires a more expensive technology. Firmsprot function
is,
i = [pi   cg(1  ti)  cf ti]Di (x) (3)
Note that rmsdecisions take into account the cost incurred by using each technology but also depend on
the environmental awareness of consumers. Here we introduce the notion of environmental social welfare,
ESW =
P
i=g;f i +   CD   ET (4)
which is dened as the sum of industry prots and the maximum consumer utility () minus the consumer
disutility (CD) from not purchasing the preferred technological bundle and the total emissions (the environ-
mental damage) caused by aggregate pollution, ET ,4
CD =
Z x
0
(pg+(x  tg)2 )f(x)dx+
Z 
x
(pf+(tf x)2)f(x)dx; ET= e
P
i=g;f
tiDi (x) :
Consumer disutility is minimized at x = (tg+tf )=2 provided that CD
0(x) = (tg+tf 2x)(tg tf ). This means
that the extra cost of an extra consumer buying from g (f) is positive for all x > (tg+tf )=2 (x < (tg+tf )=2).
It is immediately apparent from ESW that for the technology bundle (given the uniform distribution of
consumers) for each rm to be e¢ cient it must hold that (cf+e  cg)(tf tg) = CD0(x); i.e., the cost saving
from producing by FBTs plus the environmental damage must be equal to the consumer disutility (or the
marginal social cost of not purchasing the preferred technological variety). Hence, from the social point of
view the market should be split such that x = min f; [tg+tf+(cf + e  cg)]=2g.
Assumption 1: It is socially e¢ cient for both rms to supply the product so that 0 < x < .
Assumption 2: The market supplies output by using both RETs and FBTs according to
(cg   cf   e)  tg + tf  2(cg   cf   e):
The timing of the model is as follows. At the rst stage (the production stage) rms decide on their technology
bundle. At the second stage (the retailing stage) rms engage in Bertrand competition. The model is solved
by backward induction to nd the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
4Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) dene social welfare (W ), as the sum of
the consumer surplus (CS) and rmsprots minus the social valuation of environmental damage caused by aggregate pollution,
ET .
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As a benchmark we analyze the model with no government intervention. Then we study the e¤ect that
two environmental policies have on the rmstechnology bundles and the implications for ESW . First, a
private duopoly is analyzed where the government subsidizes RETs. Second, a mixed duopoly is analyzed
where a publicly-owned rm (either a green or fossil-fuel-oriented rm) maximizes ESW .
2.1 Market performance under no government intervention
This section presents the market solution with no government intervention. For comparison purposes and
without loss of generality cf is normalized to unity hereinafter. Hence, as cg > 1 it measures cost di¤erences
between RETs and FBTs. In our setting rms are able to produce either by choosing a bundle of technologies
(thus locating within the unit interval) or to produce with a single technology (thus locating at the ends of
the unit interval).
At the retailing stage rst order conditions are found by di¤erentiating (3) with respect to pi,
(pi   cg(1  ti)  ti)@Di(x)@pi +Di (x) = 0; i = g; f .
yielding reaction functions pi(pj),
pg (pf )=
pf+(t
2
f t2g) tg(cg 1)+cg
2 ; pf (pg)=
pg+(t
2
g t2f ) tb(cg 1)+cg
2 +(tf tg): (5)
It is easy to check that second order conditions are also satised. Notice that @pf (pg) =@ is always positive.
This accounts for the consumer awareness of the environment: as  decreases the fossil-fuel-oriented rm
loses the capacity to charge a higher price in response to a price increase by the green-oriented rm.
By solving the above equation system contingent retail prices pi(ti; tj) are found as a function of the
technological strategy at the production stage,
bpg(tg; tf ) =(t2f t2g) (cg 1)(tf+2tg)+2(tf tg)18 + cg bpf (tg; tf ) =(t2g t2f) (cg 1)(2tf+tg)+4(tf tg)18 + cg:
A further inspection of the above contingent retail prices gives some interesting insights. Assume rms
technological strategy at the production stage as given. Then, for a given pair (tg; tf ) contingent retail prices
have the following properties: (i) there is a positive relationship between RETs costs and retail prices, i.e.
@bpi(tg; tf )=@cg > 0; (ii) there is an inverse relationship between consumer awareness of the environment and
retail prices, i.e. @bpi(tg; tf )=@ > 0; (iii) a change in RETs costs strongly a¤ects the retail price of the green
rm, @bpg(tg; tf )=@cg   @bpf (tg; tf )=@cg > 0; and (iv) a change in the environmental awareness of consumers
strongly a¤ects the retail price of rm f , @bpf (tg; tf )=@  @bpg(tg; tf )=@ > 0.
As this is a perfect information game, contingent retail prices are assumed to be common knowledge.
Firms incorporate these insights at the production stage in order to choose an optimal technological strategy.5
Hence, at the production stage rms choose the technology bundle aimed to maximize
i(ti; tj) = [pi(ti; tj)  cg(1  ti)  ti]Di(x(ti; tj)):
5 In Appendix 1 we report retailing stage prots under each market conguration: no government intervention, subsidy on
RETs and a publicly-owned rm, respectively.
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First order conditions @i(ti; tj)=@ti = 0 are
[
@pi(ti; tj)
@ti
+ cg   1]Di (x(ti; tj)) + [pi(ti; tj)  cg(1  ti)  ti] @Di (x(ti; tj))
@ti
= 0,
yielding rmsreaction functions ti(tj),
tg (tf ) =
tf+cg 1
3   23 ; and tf (tg) = tg+cg 13 + 43 : (6)
The solution of the above system of equations provides a characterization for interior solutions (i.e., when
both rms choose a technology bundle)
btg(cg; ) = 2(cg 1) 4 ; and btf (cg; ) = 2(cg 1)+54 : (7)
However, the set of possible technology congurations may include the use of single technologies (corner
solutions) and a combination of them (semi-corner solutions). Proposition 1 and Figure 2 characterize rms
technologies as a function of consumer awareness of the environment and RETs costs.
Proposition 1 Firms technology bundle depends on the cost di¤erences between the green-oriented and
fossil-fuel-oriented rm and the environmental awareness of consumers,
(i) Case I: Firms produce using a bundle of technologies in accordance with (7);
(ii) Case IIa: Firm g produces using a bundle of technologies in accordance with (6) which is a best
response to rm f choosing pure FBTs, (btg;btf ) = ( cg 23 ; 1);
(iii) Case IIb: Firm f produces using a bundle of technologies in accordance with (6) which is a best
response to rm g choosing pure RETs, (btg;btf ) = (0; cg 1+43 );
(iv) Case III: Firm g produces using RETs and rm f produces using FBTs solely, (btg;btf ) = (0; 1).
P roof. See appendix.
In order to characterize this set of optimal production technologies we dene functions Ti, i = g; f as
Tg = f(cg; ) 2 R2 such that tg(c; ) = 0g; and Tf = f(cg; ) 2 R2 such that tf (c; ) = 1g.
Along Ti rms produce by a single technology. Hence, Tg and Tf dene regions where both rms prefer to
produce by a bundle of technologies or to use a single technology process.
Equilibrium congurations strongly depend on the environmental awareness of consumers: as  decreases
the market share of rm g increases and thus price competition is enhanced. This yields an increase in
welfare via a reduction in environmental damage. A lower unit cost cg has the same e¤ect. In Table 1
we report market shares, price-cost margin di¤erences, and di¤erences in rmsprots under each market
conguration.6
6Table 1 reports only the market share of rm g: the market share of rm f is obtained by 1 Dg(bx).
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Figure 2: Firmstechnology bundle as a function of  and cg().
Table 1. Market performance under no government intervention.
Case I Case IIa Case IIb Case III
Dg(bx) 12 (1+5 cg)9 (3+2 cg)9 (2(1+) cg)6dpcmf   dpcmg 0 (4(1 cg)+)(1 4 cg)27 (2(3 cg)+2)( 6+5+2cg)27 2( 2++cg)3bf   bg 0 (4(1 cg)+)(1 4 cg)27 (2(3 cg)+2)( 6+5+2cg)27 2( 2++cg)3
When rms produce using mixed technologies (Case I ) the market is split down the middle. As cost
di¤erences are not great the strategic e¤ect (i.e. the incentive of rms to move away from each other) and
the demand e¤ect (i.e. the incentive of rms to remain close to each other) are quite similar yielding to
the interior solution. Moreover, rms are equally a¤ected by  and cg; thus, the ability of rms to charge
prices above their marginal cost is the same. As a result, the di¤erence in prots is zero. If rms produce
using single technology processes (Case III ) market shares are a¤ected by  and cg in opposite directions.
In particular, this case is possible when the environmental awareness of consumers and cost di¤erences are
relatively low. The underlying intuition is related to the fact that those consumers located closer to zero
have a strong preference for buying from g because this rm has a strong incentive to produce using RETs
because cg is relatively low. By contrast, there are also consumers located closer to one who buy from f ,
which may charge a better price when producing using FBTs. However, as the price advantage is relatively
low the strategic e¤ect strongly dominates the demand e¤ect. Hence, in this case the demand of rm f and
its price cost margin are always larger than those of rm g, giving the former a prot advantage. Finally,
in semi corner cases (Case IIa and Case IIb) the demand e¤ect strongly dominates the strategic e¤ect for
the rm that uses a bundle of technologies. In the case of rm g when consumers have a high level of
environmental awareness of the environment it is possible that there may be a large cost disadvantage but
it is necessary to produce partly with FBTs in order to capture demand. When consumers are also spread
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closer to one, RETs costs become more important so that rm g also needs to produce using FBTs in order
to capture demand. The semi corner case for rm f is symmetric. When consumers have a high level of
environmental awareness and RETs costs are closer to FBTs costs it is necessary for rm f to produce partly
with RETs in order to capture demand. Finally, when consumers are also spread closer to one but RETs
costs are virtually the same as FBTs costs rm f also needs to produce using RETs in order to capture
demand.
2.2 Welfare analysis under no government intervention
This section analyzes welfare. In our environment market failure means that rms choose a technology
bundle other that that preferred by a benevolent social welfare maximizer. In our framework market failures
come from three forces: (i) cost di¤erences between technologies; (ii) pollutant emissions measured by ET ;
and (iii) consumer disutility from not purchasing a product underlying the preferred technology bundle. In
order to maximize ESW a benevolent social maximizer takes @ESW=@ti = 0, (i = g; f), which yields a
socially optimal allocation of technology bundles,
tg =
cg e 1
2 +

4 t

f =
cg e 1
2 +
3
4
Notice that in the particular case where environmental concerns are equal to zero (e = 0), consumers are
spread along the unit interval ( = 1) and the cost of RETs is the same as that of FBTs the above expressions
resemble the well-knows solution (tg; tf ) = (1=4; 3=4). By replacing optimal technology bundles at ESW the
following is obtained
ESW  =   e+ (e  )(cg   1)
2
  cg(6  cg)  1
4
+
12e2   2
48
.
In the case of an interior solution when there is no government intervention in the market routine calculations
yield the following:
\ESW =   e+ (e  )(cg   1)
2
  cg(6  cg)  1
4
  13
2
48
Now we measure welfare di¤erences for the case when both rms produce using a bundle of technologies. As
corner and semi corner cases strongly depend on parameter values we perform a further inspection after the
analysis of environmental policies in order to establish relevant comparisons. Thus, for the interior market
solution
ESW   \ESW = (e
2 + 2)
4
;
so di¤erences come only from environmental concerns, namely e and . It is straightforward to check
that @(ESW  \ESW )=@e > 0 and @(ESW  \ESW )=@ > 0, which means that a reduction in pollutant
emissions and increases in the environmental awareness of consumers enhance \ESW , which yields ESW   
\ESW to zero. It is important to note that cg does not a¤ect ESW di¤erences because both rms use both
technologies: it means that the role of the social planner is to internalize e and  because cg has the same
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e¤ect on welfare regardless of the solution considered. The rest of the paper is devoted to investigating how
government intervention may approach ESW  by encouraging a greener energy market.
3 Environmental policies
In this section we investigate the e¤ects of two alternative environmental policies. We assume that the
government behaves as a benevolent social maximizer. First, it decides to grant a subsidy s on RET
technologies. Second, the e¤ects of government acquisition of either the green-oriented or the fossil-fuel-
oriented rm are studied. The timing of the model remains the same as in the absence of government
intervention.
3.1 Subsidizing RETs
Here we investigate the e¤ect of a subsidy s per unit of green input (0 < s  cg 1) to reallocate RETs and
FBTs. In other words, each rm i is granted s for the set amount of RETs in its technology bundle. The
maximization problem of rm i is
i = [pi   g(s)(1  ti)  cf ti]Di (x) (8)
where g(s) = cg   s accounts for the net cost that a rm incurs when using RETs. At the retailing stage
each rm chooses prices pi as a function of the locations chosen at the production stage. By di¤erentiating
(8) with respect to pi (i = g; f) the following rst order conditions are obtained:
(pi   g(s)(1  ti)  ti)@Di (x)
@pi
+Di (x) = 0:
Reaction functions pi(pj) at the retailing stage are found,
pg (pf )=
pf+(t
2
f t2g) tg(g(s) 1)+g(s)
2 ; pf (pg)=
pg+(t
2
g t2f ) tb(g(s) 1)+g(s)
2 +(tf tg): (9)
The above expressions are the same as those in (5) except for the term g(s), which accounts for the cost
saving as a result of the subsidy s. By solving the above equation system contingent retail prices pi(ti; tj)
are found as a function of the technology strategy at the production stage,
pg(tg; tf ) =
(t2f t2g) (g(s) 1)(tf+2tg)+2(tf tg)
18 + g(s) pf (tg; tf ) =
(t2g t2f) (g(s) 1)(2tf+tg)+4(tf tg)
18 + g(s):
Notice that these contingent prices are equivalent to those with no any government intervention when
s = 0. Thus, the e¤ect of cg in pi(tg; tf ) is now reduced as s increases, @pi(tg; tf )=@cg > @pi(tg; tf )=@g(s) > 0
whereas the e¤ect of  remains the same. Finally, regardless of the level of s, a decrease in RETs costs strongly
a¤ects the retail price of the green-oriented rm.7 .
7This is because @bpi(tg ; tf )=@g(s) = @bpi(tg ; tf )=@cg , i = g; f:
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At the production stage rms choose their technology by incorporating the information pi(ti; tj) into their
prot function,
i(ti; tj) = [pi(ti; tj)  g(s)(1  ti)  ti]Di (x(ti; tj))
with rst order conditions @i(ti; tj)=@ti = 0, (i = g; f)
tg(tf ) =
tf+g(s) 1
3   23 ; and tf (tg) = tg+g(s) 13 + 43 . (10)
Solving the simultaneous system given by (10) the characterization for a pair of technology bundles is found,
etg = 2(g(s) 1) 4 ; and etf = 2(g(s) 1)+54 . (11)
An interior solution etg  0 requires g(s)  (2 + )=2 and for etf  1 it is needed that g(s)  (6   5)=2.
Thus, rms produce using technology bundles only for certain parameter values. Proposition 2 characterizes
equilibria depending on g(s).
Proposition 2 Firmstechnologies depend on the cost di¤erences between the green-oriented and fossil-fuel-
oriented rms, the environmental awareness of consumers, and the level of the subsidy,
(i) Case I: Firms produce using both types of technology (interior solution) in accordance with (11);
(ii) Case IIa: Firm g produces using a technology bundle as indicated in (10) which is a best response to
rm f choosing a pure FBTs, (etg;etf ) = ( g(s) 23 ; 1);
(iii) Case IIb: Firm f produces using a technology bundle as indicated in (10) which is a best response
to rm g choosing a pure RETs, (etg;etf ) = (0; g(s) 1+43 );
(iv) Case III: Firm g produces using RETs and rm f produces using FBTs solely, (etg;etf ) = (0;1).
P roof. See appendix.
In comparison with Proposition 1, as g(s) decreases both rms increase the proportion of RETs in their
technology bundles resulting in an increase in welfare via a reduction in environmental damage. An objection
to the RETs subsidy is that s lowers rms incentives to invest in RETs as net cost decreases. Figure 3
represents the situations summarized in Proposition 2. As can be seen in Figure 3 the e¤ect of s is to re-scale
the technology space so that now there is more opportunity for RETs.
In Table 2 we report market shares, price-cost margin di¤erences, and di¤erences in rmsprots under
each market conguration.
Table 2. Market performance with a subsidy.
Case I Case IIa Case IIb Case III
Dg(ex) 12 (1+5 g(s))9 (3+2 g(s))9 (2(1+) g(s))6gpcmf   gpcmg 0 (4(1 g(s))+)(1 4 g(s))27 (2(3 g(s))+2)( 6+5+2g(s))27 2( 2++g(s))3ef   eg 0 (4(1 g(s))+)(1 4 g(s))27 (2(3 g(s))+2)( 6+5+2g(s))27 2( 2++g(s))3
When rms produce using a technology bundle (Case I ) market shares, price cost margins di¤erences and
12
a1~,0~ => fg tt
1~,0~ <= fg tt
CASE I
CASE IIa
CASE IIb
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Figure 3: Firmstechnology bundle as a function of , s and cg().
prots di¤erences are the same as when there is no government intervention. Moreover, as it will be shown in
Section 3, welfare is enhanced. If rms produce using single technology processes (Case III ) market shares
are a¤ected by  and g(s) in opposite directions. As g(s) < cg rm g gets a bigger market share than in
the case of no government intervention because now consumers have a strong preference for buying from g
as RETs costs have decreased. In the opposite direction, consumers who buy from f obtain a smaller price
advantage as this rm has a technology bundle that is FBTs intensive. As a result, although the strategic
e¤ect still dominates the demand e¤ect, it results in a reduction in market share for rm f . Hence, in this
case the demand of rm g increases and price cost margin di¤erences and prots di¤erences are reduced.
Finally, in semi corner cases (Case IIa and Case IIb) the strategic e¤ect has more impact as the subsidy
increases, so it reinforce its dominance over the demand e¤ect for the rm that uses a single technology.
3.2 A publicly-owned rm
In this section, we consider that the government owns either the green-oriented rm or the fossil-fuel-oriented
rm). The publicly-owned rm maximizes environmental social welfare while the private one maximizes
prots. Assume that the government owns the green-oriented rm. The case in which the government owns
the fossil-fuel-oriented rm is symmetric and provides the same qualitative results.8 At the retailing stage
the rst order conditions for the publicly-owned rm are obtained by di¤erentiating (4) with respect to pg,
(pg   g(s)(1  tg)  tg)@Dg (x)
@pg
+Dg (x)  @CD
@pg
  @ET
@pg
= 0;
while the rst order condition for the private rm are obtained by di¤erentiating (3) with respect to pf ,
(pf   g(s)(1  tf )  tf )@Df (x)
@pf
+Df (x) = 0:
8 Interested readers can nd retailing-stage and production-stage equilibria for this case in Appendix 2.
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The reaction function for the publicly-owned rm is
pWg (pf ) = pf + (tf   tg)(cg   1  e);
while that for the private rm f coincides with (5). Solving the system equation retailing stage prices are
set,
pWg = (2tg tf )  (tf tg)(2e+ tg+tf ) + cg(1 + tf 2tg) + 2(tf tg);
pf= tg (tf tg)(e+ tg+tf ) + cg(1  tg) + 2(tf tg):
At the production stage the government and the prot-oriented rm incorporate this information in
order to choose an optimal technological strategy aimed at maximizing ESWg(tg; tf ) and f (tg; tf ), where
ESWg stands for government intervention in rm g. First order conditions @ESWg(tg; tf )=@tg = 0 and
@f (tg; tf )=@tf = 0 provide the following reaction functions:
tg (tf ) =
tf+cg (1+e)
3 ; and tf (tg) =
tg+cg (1+e)
3 +
2
3 : (12)
No matter whether the government owns the green-oriented rm or the fossil-fuel-oriented rm the reaction
functions are the same. This is because government ownership of the green-oriented rm forces the private
rm to take into account the amount of pollution emitted per additional unit of production. The solution
of the above system of equations provides a characterization for interior solutions (i.e. when rms choose a
technology bundle),
tg =
cg e 1
2 +

4 and t

f =
cg e 1
2 +
3
4
(13)
which coincides with that which maximizes ESW . As in the previous cases, the set of possible technology
congurations is not restricted to an interior solution. In this case semi-corner solutions are also possible.
We present the results under this market conguration in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The optimal technological strategy when the government owns either the green-oriented rm
or the fossil-fuel-oriented rm is characterized as follows,
(i) Case I: Firms prefer to produce using a bundle of technologies (interior solution) as in (13).
(ii) Case IIa: Firm g produces using a technology bundle which is a best response to rm f choosing a
pure FBTs, (tg;t

f ) = (
cg e
3 ;1);
(iii) Case IIb: Firm f produces using a technology bundle which is a best response to rm g choosing a
pure RETs, (tg;t

f ) = (0;
cg e (1 2)
3 ).
P roof. See appendix.
Figure 4 graphically describes government and private rm technology decisions as implied by the rela-
tionship between  and cg.
An interesting observation is that, in contrast with the previous sections, it is not an equilibrium for
both rms to use a single technology. Semi corner cases are found when RETs costs are too high or too
14
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Figure 4: Firmstechnology bundle as a function of , e and cg().
low for a given pollution level e. When RETs costs are relatively closer to FBTs costs, for a given pollution
level e, both rms prefer to produce using a bundle of technologies. This is because RETs costs are not too
high (low) compared with the environmental damage caused by the fossil-fuel-oriented rm. Thus, as the
government also cares for the environment it decides to produce using a bundle of technologies in this average
case; that is, it internalizes environmental damage caused by the use of FBTs. Notice that this depends
crucially on the level of environmental awareness of consumers, . Moreover, changes in cg and e a¤ect both
rms in the same way. In particular, @ti=@e < 0 and @ti=@cg > 0. The market is split at x = =2. Table 3
summarizes the interior solution and both semi corner cases.
Table 3. Market performance when government owns a rm.
Case I Case IIa Case IIb
Dg(x
) 12
3+e cg
3
1++e cg
3
pcmf   pcmg e2 e(3+e cg)3 e(2 (1+e) cg)3
For the case of interior solutions (Case I ) the demand and strategic e¤ects are again roughly balanced
so both rms produce using a bundle of technologies. Indeed, this solution is the rst best as a result of the
intervention by the government, which internalizes environmental damage. It is interesting to note that in
the case of semi corner solutions (Case IIa and Case IIb) there are two extreme cases in which both rms
produce using the same single technology. On one hand, when 3(1 =2)  cg   e and  ! 1 both rms
prefer to produce using FBTs. This is because consumers are spread over the unit interval so there is a
signicant group of them that does not care so much about the environment. As a result, as RETs costs are
so high compared with e, rms are forced to behave in a completely polluting fashion. On the other hand,
when cg  e  1 =2 and ! 0 both rms prefer to produce using RETs solely. This is because consumers
are so highly aware of the environment and RETs costs are so small compared with e that rms prefer to
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behave in a completely green fashion. These two special cases are in line with the well-known principle of
minimum di¤erentiation where the demand e¤ect completely o¤sets the strategic e¤ect.
4 Welfare analysis
In this section we analyze the e¤ect of the two policy measures on ESW . First we focus on the case where
both rms produce using a bundle of technologies. This case is of particular interest because parameters are
assumed to be at normal or expected levels.
When the government grants a subsidy s on RET technologies ESW is
E^SW =   e+ (e  )(g(s)  1)
2
  g(s)(6  g(s))  1
4
  13
2
48
The di¤erence with the rst best solution is
ESW    E^SW = e
2 + 2
2
  s[2(cg +   e  3)  s]
2
. (14)
Along this section ESW di¤erence with respect the rst best solution is called welfare di¤erences.The term
on the right hand side in (14) is positive and @(ESW  E^SW )=@s = (cg+  e  s  3)=4 < 0. Thus, as
s increases the di¤erence with the optimal ESW decreases. Intuitively, as  decreases and cg decreases
a low level of subsidy becomes necessary: as long as consumers environmental awareness increases and
RET costs decrease the gap is minimized. The e¤ect of the level of pollutant emissions merely a further
inspection. By taking the partial derivative, @(ESW  E^SW )=@e = (e  s)=2 it is observed that when the
level of subsidy does not o¤set the pollutant emissions the gap increases. The intuition behind this is that the
government may improve welfare by inducing rms to pollute less ex ante, for instance by setting emission
quotas, or ex post, by subsidizing RET. In both cases it moves rms locations towards zero making the
technology mix more green. These observations suggest that it is very important to reduce cg and e and
to encourage environmental awareness among consumers in order to reduce total government expenditure
s(etgDg(ex) + (1 etf )Df (ex)) arising from the subsidy.
When the government owns either the green-oriented or the fossil-fuel-oriented rm the rst best solution
is reached. The reason is that the government takes into account environmental damage but also the level
of consumer awareness of the environment. Thus, by e¢ ciently choosing the technology bundle of its own
rm it encourages its rival also to choose an e¢ cient technology bundle in order to behave competitively.
Finally, we study welfare implications when one or both rms produce using a single technology (i.e.
the semi corner and corner cases). In order to reach interesting insights we assume two particular values of
environmental awareness on the part of consumers:  = 1=2 and  = 1 which correspond to the average case
and the usual assumption of consumers spread over the unit interval, respectively. We also x RETs cost at
cg = f1; 3g. It allows us to study two extreme cases: (i) no cost di¤erences between RETs and FBTs, and
(ii) a signicant ine¢ ciency in cost by part of RETs. Inside Table 4 we report partial derivatives of welfare
di¤erences with respect s and e, depending on the market environment considered.
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In a market without any govenment intervention it is straigforward that, no matter the value of , when
there is no cost di¤erences a reduction in e enhance welfare (thus, approaching ESW ). However, this e¤ect
is not clear when cost di¤erences are high. Indeed, when consumers are more concious about environment
( = 1=2) a relative low level of e (e < 0:64) reduce welfare di¤erences. This is because FBTs becomes
more e¢ cient than RETs but also because FBTs produce relative low pollutan emissions. Indeed, rm f
produce only using FBTs and rm g moves towards the center and thus, replace RETs by FBTs. This e¤ect
is relaxed when consumers spread on the unit interval ( = 1).The maximum level of e that reduce welfare
di¤erences is lower (e < 0:21). This is because consumers are less concious about environment so that the
green-oriented rm is relative more intensive on FBTs (and rm f is at 1). The e¤ect of a subsidy is clearly
welfare enhancing and thus, reducing welfare di¤erences. However, the level of s induce rms to behave
green intensive or pollutant intensive. For instance, for the case when  = 1=2 and cg = 1 any level of s
induce rm g to produce by a 100% RETs and rm f to be intensive in RETs. Contrary to this, for the
case when  = 1 and cg = 3 the level of s yields to di¤erent technologies congurations. Indeed, if the aim
of the government is to get the most green technology mix (semi corner solution with tg = 0) at any cost it
needs at least a level of s > 5=2; a corner solution only requires a level s > 3=2; and if the government goal is
only to enhance welfare at the cost of a more pollutant technology conguration it requires s < 3=2. Finally,
when the government owns either rm g or f welfare di¤erences depend on e. Overall, semi corner solutions
require a higher e as  and cg increase. For instance, when  = 1=2 and cg = 1 it yields to semi corner
case where tg = 0 and tf < 1. Contrary to this, when  = 1 and cg = 3 semi corner cases take place only
when e is higher enough. The reason is that when consumers are less environmentaly concious and RETs
ine¢ ciency is large the relative weigh of pollutant emissions becomes less important and thus its impact on
welfare is reduced.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the e¤ect of technological processes that involve environmental damage in a green
di¤erentiated market. We assume a spatial duopoly competition model where rms sell a homogeneous
product with input di¤erentiation: the product is made using RETs and FBTs. In a two-stage game rms
rst decide on their technology bundles (the ratio of green and polluting inputs) and secondly Bertrand
competition takes place.
In this setting, we rst characterize optimal technology bundles, price cost margins and market shares
in the absence of government intervention, and the environmentally optimal social welfare solution. It is
shown that in the absence of government intervention both rms prefer to produce using a bundle of RETs
and FBTs except in the case when RETs are extremely costly or consumer awareness of the environment
is su¢ ciently high. In that case rms prefer to produce using a single technology instead of a bundle of
technologies.
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Second, the option of subsidizing RETs and the existence of a publicly-owned rm to foster a green
di¤erentiated energy market aimed at approaching the environmentally optimal social welfare solution are
analyzed. Overall, both policies yield a more environmentally-friendly technology bundle except when RETs
costs are too high. Moreover, environmental social welfare is enhanced. In particular, it is shown that the
fossil-fuel-oriented rm reduces its market share as long as the cost di¤erence decrease. When the government
introduces a subsidy it encourages both rms to produce using more RETs. The cases in which both rms
prefer to produce using a single technology become more di¢ cult to achieve because the subsidy allows
strong di¤erences in costs for all levels of environmental awareness on the part of consumers. Thus, it could
be a negative policy measure if the aim is to encourage rms to invest in order to decrease RETs costs.
When we focus on the case when the government owns either the green-oriented rm or the fossil-fuel-
oriented rm it is shown that rms prefer to produce using a bundle of technologies as the demand and
strategic e¤ects are roughly balanced. Moreover, this solution is the rst best as a result of the government
intervention which internalizes environmental damage. There are also two extreme cases where one rm
produces using a single technology as a result of a low cost di¤erence (there is a pure green rm) or when
that cost di¤erence is very high (there is a pure fossil-fuel-oriented rm) for a given level of pollutant
emissions.
Finally, it is important to note that in the case of a subsidy there is an ex post market distortion because
relative prices are modied by the subsidy, whereas in the case of a publicly-owned rm there is a non
negligible ex ante market distortion caused by the active role of the government in the market.
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Appendix 1: retailing stage prots.
 No government intervention.
g (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(1+tg+tf+2 cg)2
18 ; f (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(1+tg+tf 4 cg)2
18 :
 Implementation of a subsidy.
g (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(1+tg+tf+2 g(s))2
18 ; f (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(1+tg+tf 4 g(s))2
18 :
 Mixed duopoly. Retailing stage welfare and retailing stage private rms prots.
ESW i (tg; tf )= +
t3f t2f (2 tg 2g(s) 4) tf (1+e tg g(s) 2)( g(s) 2) tg(2+g(s))
4 +
+
g(s)(ltg 2)
2  
2
3 ;
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fg (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(+tg g(s))2
2 ; and 
g
f (tg; tf )=
(tf tg)(+tg g(s) 2)2
2 :
where  = 1 + e+ tg , and i; j = g; f . Superscripts on prot functions stand for that rm owned by the state.
Appendix 2: government owns the fossil-fuel-oriented rm.
 Retailing stage: Government chooses the pf that maximizes ESW , for which the reaction function is:
pWf (pg) = pg+(tg tf )(cg 1  e);
while the private rm g chooses the pg which maximizes prots, for which the reaction function coincides with
(5). By solving this system equation retailing stage prices are set,
pWf = (2tf tg)  (tg tf )(2e+ tf+tg) + cg(1 + tg 2tf );
pg= tf (tg tf )(e+ tf+tg) + cg(1  tf ):
 Production stage: First order conditions @ESW f (tg; tf )=@tf= 0 and @g(tg; tf )=@tg= 0 provide rmsre-
action functions, which coincide with those obtained in (12) in Subsection 3.2. Thus, the same equilibrium is
obtained.
Appendix 3: proof of propositions.
 Proof of proposition 1. By taking the expressions in (7) we can characterize interior solutions. Assume
tg(cg; ) = 0 and tf (cg; ) = 1. This yields functions Ti, i = g; f . An examination the gradient vector
rtg(cg; ) = (+; ) and rtf (cg; ) = (+;+) reveals that values tg> 0 and tf< 1 exist below Tf and over
Tg . As Tf meets Tg at  = 2=3 and cg= 4=3 (see Figure 2) four types of can be dened. (i) Case I (In-
terior solution) requires 0 <  < 2=3 where Tf > T g . Accordingly, tg(cg; ) > 0 and tf (cg; ) < 1 implies
that cg2 ((2 + )=2; (6  5)=2). (ii) Case III (corner solution). Taking the information of the gradient
vectors, this requires Tf < T g which in turn yields 2=3 <   1. Start by setting tf= 1 as tf cannot ex-
ceed one. The best response of rm g is tg(1) = (cg 2)=3. The best response of rm f on tg(1) is then
tf [tg(1)] = (10+ 4cg 3)=9 which is larger than one for cg> (6  5)=2. Now assume that tg= 0 as tg
cannot be negative. The best response of rm f is tf (0) = (cg+4  1)=3. The best response of rm g on
tf (0) is then tg[tf (0)] = (4(cg 1)  2)=3 which is always negative for cg< (2 + )=2. (iii) Semi corner
solutions. Case IIa: As rtf (cg; ) = (+;+) rm f always chooses pure FBT when tf 1. Using the in-
formation contained in (i) and (ii) rm g produces using a technology bundle as indicated in (7) when Tf is
active, that is, when 0 <  < 2=3 which implies cg> (6  5)=2, and also when Tg is active, that is, when
2=3 <   1 which implies cg> (2 + )=2. Case IIb: Analogously, as rtg(cg; ) = (+; ) rm g always
chooses pure RET when tg 1. Firm f produces using a technology bundle as indicated in (7) when Tg is
active, that is, when 0 <  < 2=3 which implies cg< (2 + )=2, and also when Tf is active, that is, when
2=3 <   1 which implies cg< (6  5)=2. This completes the proof.
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 Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of this proposition is analogous to Proposition 1, replacing cg by g(s).
 Proof of proposition 3. We proceed in three steps. (i) Case I (interior solution): By taking (13) we have to
nd values of e and  which provide 0 < ftg; tfg < 1. First, tg> 0 implies that 2cg+  2(1 + e) > 0 )
cg e > 1  =2. Second, tf< 1 implies that 2cg+3  2(1 + e) < 4 ) cg e < 3(1  =2). (ii) Case IIa
(semi corner solution) with tg> 0 and tf= 1 as tf cannot exceed one. The best response is tg(1) = cg e > 0 as
we assume that cg e > 3(1  =2). The best response of rm f on tg(1) is then tf [tg(1)] = [4(cg e)  3(1  2)]=9
> 1 as cg e > 3(1  =2). We thus conclude that tg= (cg e)=3 and tf= 1. (iii) Case IIb (semi corner solu-
tion) with tf< 1 and tg= 0 as tg cannot be negative. The best response is tf (0) = [cg+2  (1 + e)]=3 < 1 as
we assume that cg e < 1  =2. The best response of rm g on tf (0) is then tg[tf (0)] = [4(cg e)  (1  2)  3]=9
which is lower than zero as long as cg e < 1  =2. We thus conclude that tg= 0 and tf= [(cg e)  (1  2)]=3.
This completes the proof.
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